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Motivated  by  the  recent  debate  on  the 
macroeconomic  implications  of  the  new 
bank  regulatory  standards  known  as  Basel 
III, this paper examines the impact of higher 
capital  ratios  on  aggregate  output  in  a 
comprehensive panel of African economies. 
We  quantify  benefits  stemming  from  lower 
probability  of  banking  crises  due  to  more 
stringent  capital  holdings  using  a 
multivariate logit model. Costs, measured as 
the  impact  of  higher  lending  rates  premia 
over  deposit  rates  due  to  higher  capital 
levels  on  aggregate  output,  are  quantified 
using  panel  data  models  with  fixed  effects. 
We find that there are net benefits associated 
with  tightened  capital  ratios,  and  conclude 
that,  by  strengthening  the  resilience  of  its 
banking systems, the new global standards 
might  lead  to  long-term  welfare  gains  for 
African economies..  
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1.  Introduction 
Africa escaped the recent global financial crisis relatively unscathed. While the region could not 
avoid the spillover effects of the ensuing global economic downturn, its banking sector proved 
generally resilient. This was mainly due to the structural reforms implemented over the past 
decade, including strengthening the relevant regulatory and supervisory systems within a sounder 
and more flexible macroeconomic management framework. 
Against this background, countries in the region need to advance their financial sector reform 
agenda.  While  financial  deepening  and  access  to  financial  services  remain  the  main  policy 
objectives, sustainable and inclusive economic growth rests ultimately on financial stability. In 
this context, the recent global regulatory response to the financial crisis, in particular the Basel 
Committee  on  Banking  Supervision’s  (BCBS)  reform  package  known  as  Basel  III  offers  a 
valuable opportunity to reexamine Africa’s financial sector reform agenda. 
Basel III introduces a comprehensive set of measures which complements the Basel II and Basel 
I frameworks, with the aim to improve the resilience of banking systems. The cornerstone of 
Basel III is higher and better quality capital, mostly common equity, with improved absorption 
features,  complemented  by  newly  introduced  liquidity  requirements  (BCBS,  2010a).  Other 
prudential elements of the BCBS package which are relevant for the African banking systems 
are:  i)  supplemental  Pillar  2  guidance  with  regards  to  banks’  firm-wide  risk  management 
processes and capital planning processes (BCBS, 2009); ii) a leverage ratio expected to work as 
backstop  measure;  and,  iii)  capital  conservation  and  counter-cyclical  buffers  to  help  protect 
banks against excessive credit growth (BCBS, 2010a).
 2 
Africa  is  making  important  efforts  to  move  to  Basel  II.  A  recent  survey  conducted  by  the 
Financial Stability Institute (FSI) revealed that fifteen African countries as opposed to twelve in 
a previous survey intend to adopt Basel II by 2015 (FSI, 2010; 2006). There are reasons to 
believe that the region might benefit from implementing the enhanced Basel II capital framework 
and the new global micro- and macro-prudential banking standards. First, Basel III can provide a 
good  basis  for  improving  risk  management  and  supervisory  practices.  Second,  a  macro-
prudential  approach  to  regulation  can  contribute  to  improve  oversight  of  systemic  risk  and 
                                                 
2 Key elements of the new capital framework include a minimum common equity Tier 1 ratio of 4.5 percent to be 
phased in by 1 January 2015 at the latest. The Tier1 capital ratio will be complemented by a capital conservation 
buffer of 2.5 percent to ensure that banks do not deplete their capital by making distributions to their shareholders, 
and a countercyclical buffer of up to 2.5 percent, to be activated at the discretion of the designated national authority 
in case of excessive credit growth. This means that de facto under the new regulation banks will be subject to a 
minimum Tier 1 ratio of 7 percent and a total capital ratio of 10.5 percent. The capital conservation buffer is 
expected  to  be  phased  in  by  1  January  2019  at  the  latest,  while  the  countercyclical  buffer  is  still  subject  to 
consultations.    6 
reduce  opportunities  for  capital  arbitrage  while  promoting  a  level  playing  field.  Finally, 
heightened capital requirements can contribute to increase the resilience of the financial system.
3 
In spelling out  a strategy to move to Basel  III, we believe it is important to assess the 
implications of regulatory reforms on economic performance, particularly of higher capital 
requirements, given their potential impact on macroeconomic outcomes. The existence of a 
“bank capital channel” through which changes in bank capital regulation have macroeconomic 
implications  is  well  documented  in  the  literature.
4  During the consultation on th e proposed 
reforms, concerns were raised, among others, that tighter and more demanding capital rules for 
the banking sector would stifle progress in the recovery of the world economy by negatively 
affecting the availability of credit supply and ultimately   economic growth. In view of these 
concerns, a number of studies have attempted to assess the macroeconomic impact of the new 
regulatory standards.  
A first strand of the literature is concerned with estimating the net benefits of increased capital 
ratios in terms of output. The BCBS (2010b) conducted an international assessment to estimate 
the impact of capital and liquidity reforms on the global economy. The study analyzed the long -
term economic costs and benefits for advanced economies. By employing a ra nge of models, it 
found that, compared to pre-reform state, net benefits range from 0.68 to 1.90 percent of GDP. 
Barrell et al (2009) investigated benefits and costs of changes in prudential requirements for the 
U.K. They estimated the benefits of higher capital and liquidity requirements on GDP through a 
multi-variate logit analysis. Associated economic costs in terms of higher borrowing costs for the 
household and corporate sectors are calculated through an estimated Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DGSE) model. They found a positive net benefit from regulatory tightening. For 
example, an increase of 1 percent in capital and liquidity requirements is associated with a net 
permanent benefit of 5 basis points of 2009 GDP. More recently, Miles et al (2011) estimated the 
optimal bank capital levels for the U.K., defined as the level of capital where the marginal 
benefits of having an extra cushion just falls to the marginal costs of having extra capital. They 
concluded that the socially-optimal capital ratio is in the 16 -20 percent range, when extreme 
shocks to GDP are not considered, a level which is at least twice as large as the Basel III ratio. 
The Bank of Canada (2010) performed a cost-benefit analysis of the long-run impact of reforms 
on the Canadian economy and concluded that the net benefits are likely to be substantial, 
amounting to 0.8 percent of GDP for an increase of 2 percentage points in the bank capital ratio. 
In a paper which is closest to ours, Wong et al (2010) provided a cost -benefit analysis of higher 
regulatory capital levels for Hong Kong. The long -term benefits are again assumed to derive 
from a lower probability of banking crises based on a logit model, while the costs are mainly 
reflected in a lower output as a result of higher lend ing spreads using a vector error-correction 
model (VECM). They found that higher capital requirements translate into a net benefit for the 
                                                 
3  See, for example, Calice (2010) and Wellink (2011). 
4 Francis and Osborne (2009a) offer a comprehensive review of the literature on the “bank capital channel”.    7 
Hong Kong economy in the range of 0.02-0.17 percent of real pre-crisis GDP for capital ratios 
between 9 and 14 percent. 
A  second  strand  of  the  literature  focuses  only  on  the  costs  associated  with  higher  capital 
requirements in terms of forgone GDP. The Macroeconomic Assessment Group (MAG, 2010a; 
2010b), set up by the Financial Stability Board and the BCBS, estimated the short-term transition 
costs associated with the adoption of the new standards. The results suggest a modest impact on 
aggregate output. The median reduction in GDP from a 1 percent increase in capital ratios is 
estimated to be 0.19 percent from the baseline path after four years and half, or a reduction in the 
annual growth rate of 4 basis points over the same period. Slovik and Cournède (2011) estimated 
the medium-term aggregate economic costs of compliance with Basel III requirements on the 
U.S.,  the  Euro  Area  and  Japan  combining  an  accounting-based  framework  with  a  global 
macroeconomic model. They found that meeting the new capital requirements by 2019 would 
increase lending spreads by  0.5 percent  and cost  15 basis points  of lower  GDP  growth per 
annum. The Institute of International Finance (2010) analyzed the impact of bank regulatory 
reforms on the global economy. By building a number of accounting frameworks linking the 
evolution of the banking sector in aggregate with the real economy, it found that the aggregate 
level of GDP in the U.S, Euro Area and Japan would be 3.1 percent lower in 2015 than it would 
otherwise be under a scenario with no regulatory reform. Finally, using a VECM, Gambacorta 
(2011) estimated the long-term economic costs of regulatory reform for the U.S. and found that 
one percentage point increase in the capital ratio translates into a 0.1 percent drop in the level of 
steady state output compared to the baseline.  
To the best of our knowledge, there is no study that addresses the question of the macroeconomic 
impact of the new international regulatory standards on developing countries, particularly on 
African economies. This paper contributes to fill this gap by trying to answer the following 
question:  what  is the impact  of tighter capital ratios  on long-term  economic performance in 
Africa? African banking systems on average already hold capital levels in excess of statutory 
minimum requirements. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to investigate whether there is 
still room to raise capital holdings from current levels while achieving net aggregate economic 
gains. In particular, this paper presents an assessment of the long-term economic benefits and 
costs of higher capital ratios in terms of their impact on output. Importantly, the aim of the paper 
is not to provide an estimate of the optimal level of regulatory capital requirements for African 
banking systems. Consistently with other studies, the focus is on the macroeconomic impact of 
representative changes in bank capital adequacy ratios based on definitions and historical data 
that  do  not  correspond  directly  to  those  introduced  by  Basel  III.  Finally,  this  study  focuses 
exclusively on the long run, assessing the shift from one steady state to another, and does not 
consider the shorter-term costs associated with the transition. 
To  estimate  the  long-term  macroeconomic  impact  of  higher  capital  holdings  on  African 
economies in terms of output, we follow a three-step approach. First, we estimate the long-term 
benefits. As in related studies (Barrell et al, 2009; BCBS, 2010b; Bank of Canada, 2010; Wong   8 
et al, 2010), we quantify the gains in African GDP resulting from a reduced probability of future 
banking  crises.  This  involves calculating the expected  yearly output  gains  associated with  a 
reduction in the frequency of banking crises in the continent. This is equivalent to the reduction 
in the probability of banking crises times the discounted output costs of their multi-year effects. 
The  calculation  therefore  requires  an  estimation  of  the  discounted  costs  of  crises  and  an 
estimation of the (positive) impact of higher capital ratios on those costs. The estimation of the 
discounted costs of crises  is  based on  Laeven  and Valencia (2010). The mapping of tighter 
capital ratios into reductions in the probability of banking crises is done based on a multi-variate 
logit model for a panel of 19 countries for which data are available over the period 1980-2008. 
Second, we estimate the long-run economic costs of higher capital  ratios  on output. This is 
equivalent to estimating the impact on the cost of bank credit. The higher cost of credit lowers 
investment and consumption, which in turn affects the steady-state level of output. We use two 
panel data for 22 countries over the period 2001-2008 to quantify this. In the first model, we 
analyze the long-run relationship between capital buffers and lending spreads.  In the second 
model, we examine the long-term relationship between lending spreads and GDP.  
Finally, we combine the previous results to quantify the net effect of higher capital ratios on 
aggregate output of African economies. The main result of the paper is that tighter capital ratios 
have net positive effects on the level of long-run steady-state output for a relatively wide range 
of capital levels. There are increasing net benefits for capital ratios up to four percentage points 
higher than the current level. Thereafter, net benefits start decreasing and, for increases in the 
current capital ratio of more than nine percentage points, the marginal net benefits of higher 
capitalization turn negative. Given that African banking systems hold on average capital buffers 
in excess of minimum requirements, the findings of this paper suggest that African regulators 
should ensure that African banks keep current levels of capitalization at a minimum. One option 
to influence bank behavior would be to raise capital requirements so as to provide a regulatory 
floor under current capital ratios. In this context, Basel III offers an important opportunity to 
strengthen the resilience of African banking systems.  
Admittedly, the results of our empirical analysis are subject to substantial uncertainty, reflecting 
data limitations, the specific models used in the analysis, the cross-country dimension of the 
study, and the omission of other relevant factors difficult to quantify such as the impact of higher 
capital ratios on output volatility and the spillover effects from implementation of Basel III in the 
rest of the world. Nonetheless, we believe this paper provides a broad overview of the long-term 
economic impact of tightened capital levels on African economies. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 estimates the benefits associated with 
more stringent capital buffers, in terms of lower expected output losses due to lower frequency of 
banking  crises.  Section  3  estimates  the  costs  of  tightened  capital  ratios  in  terms  of  forgone 
output. Combining the results of the previous sections, Section 4 discusses the net benefits of   9 
heightened  capital  ratios  to  African  economies.  Some  concluding  remarks  and  policy 
implications are presented in Section 5. 
2.  Economic benefits of tightened capital ratios 
Tightened  capital  ratios  can  have  beneficial  macroeconomic  effects  mainly  through  three 
channels. First, more stringent capital buffers reduce the probability of systemic banking crises 
and hence their effects in terms of forgone output. Second, enhanced capital ratios may lead to 
reduced severity of crises and smaller output volatility, thereby leading to welfare gains. In this 
section, we focus on the steady-state economic benefits of higher capital levels associated with a 
reduced probability of systemic banking crisis and with the severity of crisis. We omit the impact 
on output volatility due to serious data limitations. 
The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we calculate the economic benefits due to a lower 
probability and severity of banking crises.  This requires  knowledge of  (i) the probability of 
banking crises; and, (ii) the impact of a banking crisis on output. The probability of banking 
crises is proxied by the frequency with which banking crises have historically occurred in the 
region. The impact of banking crises on output is calculated as the cumulative discounted output 
loss associated with a systemic banking crisis. Second, we estimate the impact of a change in 
capital ratios on the probability of banking crises. This requires estimation of a multivariate logit 
model. 
2.1.Benefits from reduced costs associated with banking crises 
Systemic banking crises produce a cost in terms of forgone output: after a crisis, output falls and 
it takes typically several years before it returns to its old steady state path, or before it reaches its 
pre-crisis level on a new, permanently lower, growth path.  
One way to calculate the macroeconomic impact of systemic banking crises is to estimate the 
discounted cumulative output loss following a crisis normalized by the trend (see, among others, 
Laeven and Valencia, 2008; and Cecchetti et al, 2009).
5 Therefore, the macroeconomic benefit 
associated with a change in capital ratios is equal to the change in the probability of crises due to 
the reform times the impact of a crisis in terms of output: 
Benefit = Δ prob {crises} × ΔGDP 
Estimation of the macroeconomic benefits associated with a strengthening of capital buffers, 
then, must be done using a two-step approach. First, the macroeconomic loss associated with a 
systemic banking crisis is computed as the cumulative output loss. Second, the impact of the 
change in capital levels on the probability of crises is estimated using a multivariate logit model. 
The probability of banking crises can be reasonably approximated by the frequency with which 
banking crises have occurred historically. We measure the frequency of banking crises in Africa 
                                                 
5 In this case the discount rate equals the trend growth rate.   10 
as the number of crises experienced by African countries between 1980 and 2008 divided by the 
product  of  the  number  of  years  and  the  number  of  countries  in  the  sample,  independent  of 
whether countries experienced a crisis or not.  
The  sample  includes  53  countries,  observed  over  29  years.  Based  on  Laeven  and  Valencia 
(2010), we find that the number of crises in Africa is equal to 43, which results in a frequency of 
crisis  equal  to  2.7  percent  a  year.
6  This is lower than the   frequency found for advanced 
economies: averaging across samples and definitions, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) find that the 
frequency of banking crises in G -10 countries is 5.2 percent over the period 1985 -2009, while 
Laeven and Valencia (2008) estimate a 4.1 percent over the same period. 
The economic cost associated with banking crises can be calculated in terms of cumulative 
output loss. There are several approaches that can be applied to calculate forgone output. One 
approach assumes that the cost of the  crisis is temporary and calculates the output loss as the 
difference between GDP at the peak and i) GDP at the cyclical trough; ii) GDP when the pre -
crisis trend growth rate recovers; iii) GDP when the pre -crisis path level is regained. Another 
approach assumes that the cost of the crisis is permanent and calculates the loss as the difference 
between GDP at the peak and GDP when the pre-crisis growth rate is regained. 
To calculate the discounted output loss for African economies, we refer to Laeven and Valencia 
(2008; 2010). Based on a combination of quantitative measures and qualitative assessments, the 
authors define a systemic banking crisis as a situation when a country’s non-household private 
sector experiences difficulties in repaying its obligations  fully and timely. They truncate the 
duration of crises at 5 years, including the first crisis year. Output losses are computed as the 
cumulative difference between actual and trend real GDP, expressed as a percentage of trend real 
GDP for the period [T, T+3], where T is the starting  year of the crisis. Trend real GDP is 
computed by applying an HP filter (λ=100) to the GDP series over [T-20, T-1]. This gives, for 
African countries, a median loss of 33 percent of GDP. 
Unlike other related works (see, for example, BCBS, 2010b), we do not distinguish between 
crises that have no permanent effect on output and crises that have a permanent effect on output. 
This is motivated by the observation that, in the sample at hand, in no cases a banking crisis has 
had a permanent effect on the equilibrium path of GDP. This makes the measurement of the 
expected  benefits  from  reducing  the  frequency  of  banking  crises  trivial.  We  calculate  the 
economic benefit of enhanced capital requirements due to a lower frequency of banking crisis as 
the reduction in the annual probability of a crisis times the cost of the crisis, calculated as the 
discounted present value of the cumulative output loss. This gives an expected annual benefit of 
reducing the probability of crises by 1 percent equal to 0.33 percent of GDP. With a reduction 
equal to 2 percent the expected annual benefit would be equal to 0.66 percent of GDP, and so on. 
                                                 
6 The assumption is that the length of a crisis is one year. Adjusting for the average three-year duration of crises 
observed historically in African countries will increase the frequency to 8.5 percent.   11 
These calculations are, however, simply the product of the change in the annual probability of a 
crisis and the cost if the crisis occurs. Hence, they do not depend on how the reduction in the 
probability of a crisis is achieved. The next step is to link tighter capital holdings to the change in 
the probability of a banking crisis. 
2.2.The impact of capital ratios on the probability of crisis 
We estimate the impact of capital ratios on the probability of crises using a multivariate logit 
model. The model has become the workhorse in the empirical literature on the causes of banking 
crises since its introduction in Demirgüç-Kunt and Detriagiache (1998). In a logit model, the 
probability of a banking crisis is assumed to be a function of a vector of potential explanatory 
variables. Given the hypothesized functional form, typically linear, the estimated logit gives a 
summary measure of fragility, i.e. the estimated probability of a crisis. 
The dependent variable is a binary variable, Pt,i, which takes a value of 1 at time t if country i has 
been  hit  by  a  crisis  at  time  t,  and  0  otherwise.  Pt,i  is  assumed  to  depend  on  a  vector  of  k 
explanatory  variables,  xt,i.  Let  β  be  the  vector  of  parameters  to  be  estimated,  and  F  the 
cumulative  probability  distribution  function,  assumed  to  be  logistic.  Then  the  log-likelihood 
function of the model that must be maximized is: 
        ∑ ∑ {      [ (      )]              [        ]} 
 
   
 
   
 
It must be noticed that the estimated coefficients would then reflect the impact of a change in the 
correspondent explanatory variable on ln(    /(1-    )), not on     . 
We estimate a multivariate logit models for a sample of 19 African countries which have been 
historically hit by a banking crisis and for which data are available. The countries are: Benin, 
Burkina  Faso,  Cameroon,  Central  African  Republic,  Chad,  Congo  (Democratic  Republic), 
Congo (Republic), Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Niger 
Senegal,  Sierra  Leone,  Togo,  Tunisia,  Zimbabwe.  The  estimation  of  the  model  is  based  on 
annual data for the period 1980-2008. 
Following other recent works on the subject (see, among others, Demirgüç-Kunt et al, 2006; 
Barrell et al, 2010; Wong et al, 2010), we adopt a general-to-specific approach. Our general 
specification includes as explanatory variables: the capital asset ratio, defined as capital and 
reserves to total unweighted assets (CAR); the year-on-year GDP growth rate (YG); real GDP 
per capita (GDPPC); private credit  growth  (CG);  private  credit  as  a ratio of GDP (CGDP); 
money supply as a ratio of foreign exchange reserves (M2RES); the change in the terms of trade 
(TOTD); the current account balance (CA); the annual inflation rate calculated as the yearly 
change in the GDP deflator (INFL); the real interest rate (RIR); and, the rate of depreciation   12 
(DEP).
7  Robust standard errors have been computed using the Huber -White quasi-maximum 
likelihood approach. Results of our general-to-specific approach are reported in Table 1.
8  
The  general  model  –  Model  1  –  has  been  progressively  reduced  so  to  include  only  those 
explanatory variables that are statistically significant at least at a 10 percent level. We find that 
high credit growth, high real interest rates, unfavorable changes in the terms of trade and current 
account deficits are all positively correlated with the probability of a banking crisis. High GDP 
growth, in line with the literature that has examined other countries, is robustly significant over all 
specifications and reduces the probability of a banking crisis. Interestingly, we find that there is a 
positive and significant effect of an increase in the bank capital-asset ratio: a higher capital-asset 
ratio is correlated with lower probability of crisis.  
Table 1: Banking Crisis Determinants 
 
Model 6 Model 5 Model 4 Model 3 Model 2 Model 1
CAR -0.536**￿ ￿ -0.343** -0.645** -0.590** -0.626** -0.533**
CG(-1) 0.025* 0.025* 0.034* 0.034* 0.033* 0.017
YG -0.177*** -0.168*** -0.184*** -0.183*** -0.181*** -0.167***
RIR 0.171*** 0.171*** 0.175*** 0.199** 0.197** 0.195**
TOTD 0.027* 0.027* 0.028* 0.028* 0.027* 0.024
CA  0.115** 0.168*** 0.169*** 0.167*** 0.169*** 0.149***
CGDP 0.189 0.442 0.452 0.491 0.502
M2RES -0.271 -0.283 -0.287 -0.230
INFL 0.028 0.024 0.031
GDPPC -0.001 -0.001
DEP 0.003
Pseudo R-Squared 0.218 0.224 0.232 0.233 0.233 0.218
 
These results provide interesting insights on the origins of banking crises in Africa. First, the 
general-to-specific approach leads to identifying three sets of explanatory variables of banking 
crises in Africa: real economy indicators (GDP growth, the real interest rate), external sector 
indicators (the current account, changes in the terms of trade), and banking sector indicators 
(credit  growth,  the  capital-asset  ratio).  Second,  the  estimated  model  allows  calculating  the 
expected benefits of a change in capital levels. To do so, we need to calculate the marginal effect 
of a change in the explanatory variable of interest, i.e. CAR, on the probability of crises. Let xj be 
the j-th explanatory variable included in our vector of regressors and yi the dependent variable, 
then we need to calculate:  
                                                 
7 Data for CAR are taken from the IMF IFS database: line 27A / (line 20 + line 21 + line 22A+ line 22D+ line 27R). 
Data on GDP growth, Net barter terms of trade, Inflation, Nominal GDP, Money and quasi money to total reserves, 
Domestic  credit  to  private  sector,  GDP  per  capita  and  Current  account  balance  are  taken  from  the  World 
Development Indicators. All remaining variables are taken from the IMF IFS database. 
8 Dots denote statistical significance: * denotes 10  percent significance level, ** denotes 5  percent significance 
level, *** denotes 1 percent significance level.   13 
           
    
       
      
where         denotes the conditional expected value of yi, β is the vector of parameters and f(∙) 
is the logistic function.  
Results show that, for the average capital-asset ratio observed over the period 1980-2008, all 
other  things  being  equal,  the  marginal  impact  of  a  change  in  the  capital-asset  ratio  on  the 
probability of crises has been equal to 0.7 percent. This implies that, starting from the observed 
average capital-asset ratio, a 1 percent increase in the CAR would have decreased the likelihood 
of a crisis by 0.7 percent, which in turn implies a gain in terms of expected output equal to 
0.007×0.33=0.23 percent. For higher levels of the CAR, there are decreasing marginal benefits.  
The bank capital ratio used in the analysis is, however, different from the regulatory measure 
endorsed by Basel III. The next step is therefore to map the results obtained for the capital-asset 
ratio into the relevant regulatory variable. 
2.3.Translating regulatory ratios into bank capital-asset ratio 
To measure the effect of a change in regulatory bank capital ratios on the probability of systemic 
banking crisis and then on GDP, we need to map our bank capital measure, i.e. the capital and 
reserves to total asset ratio, into relevant regulatory ratio. Basel III has fundamentally tightened 
the definition of Tier 1 capital, with a stronger emphasis on tangible common equity, while 
moving  away  from  non-loss-absorbing  hybrid  instruments.  At  the  same  time,  the  new  bank 
regulatory  framework  has  substantially  widened  the  risk  coverage  and  remodeled  risk 
weightings. Due to data limitations, we use the Tier 1-to-Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) ratio 
based on definitions under Basel I and Basel II as a proxy for the Basel III capital ratio. The 
actual values of core capital and RWAs under the new regulation will therefore differ. However, 
the difference is likely to be negligible. On the one hand, the quality of the core capital base of 
African banks is typically high due to the general absence of innovative hybrid instruments; on 
the other hand, credit risk remains the main concern of the banks in the region vis-à-vis market 
risk. 
Like in BCBS (2010b), the mapping of Tier 1/RWA is based on a simple OLS regression of the 
form: 
              
where Zi represents the specific bank capital adequacy ratio defined as capital plus reserves to 
total assets and Xi is the Tier1/RWA ratio. The regression is weighted based on total assets and is 
run without constant.  Data are taken from Bankscope and cover the period 2001-2008. The 
sample  is  composed  of  1,065  African  banks.  Data  have  been  cleaned  up  of  outliers  before 
estimation, leaving a total of 1,061 observations.    14 
Results show that a Tier1/RWA ratio of 21 percent is roughly equivalent to an average ratio of 
capital and reserves to total assets of 15 percent and is associated with a probability of a systemic 
crisis of 2.7 percent, which is roughly equal to the historical average experience.  
We can now quantify the impact of a change in regulatory capital ratios on the probability of 
crisis  and,  in  turn,  on  output.  Table  2  shows  the  results.  The  second  column  reports  the 
probability of systemic banking crisis associated with a given Tier1/RWA ratio, as reported in 
the first column, starting from a level of 20 percent, a 1 percentage point below the observed 
historical average ratio of 21 percent for the region as a whole. The third column reports the 
estimated expected output gain due to a 1 percent increase in the Tier1/RWA ratio from the 
previous level. 
Table 2: The impact of capital on the probability of systemic banking crisis 














33 0.88 0.001  
Results show that a 1 percent increase in the regulatory capital ratio relative to the current level 
would reduce the probability of banking crisis of about 0.5 percent - from a probability of 2.7 
percent associated with a Tier1/RWA equal to 21 percent to a probability of 2.20 percent for a 
Tier1/RWA equal  to  22 percent  - with  an associated output gain  of about  0.165 percent.  A 
further 1 percent increase would reduce the probability of banking crisis of another 0.37 percent - 
from 2.20 percent to 1.83 percent - leading to an overall output gain of 0.12 percent of GDP. 
Further increases of the Tier1/RWA ratio would still reduce the probability of banking crisis 
though with a declining marginal contribution. 
2.4.The impact of capital requirements on the severity of crisis 
Tightened  capital  levels  are  expected  to  reduce  not  only  the  probability  of  occurrence  of  a 
systemic banking crisis, but also its severity. Banks entering a crisis with relatively stronger 
capital  ratios  are likely  to  spare the economy some of the costs in  terms  of forgone output 
associated with a crisis. This implies that lower capital ratios are likely to be associated with   15 
higher output losses during the ensuing crisis. However, we do not find any statistical support for 
this conclusion. Based on the sample of 19 countries used in the previous section to estimate the 
impact of higher capital ratios on the probability of crisis, we regress the cumulative output 
losses on the capital-asset ratio and find that the regressor coefficient is not statistically different 
from zero. This result is in line with the findings of BCBS (2010b), and therefore we hold the 
assumption in the empirical analysis that tougher capital ratios have no impact on the severity of 
crises.  
3.  Economic costs of tightened capital ratios 
Despite  their  benefits,  heightened  capital  ratios  are  likely  to  impose  long-term  costs  on  the 
economy as banks will try to pass on to their customers the higher cost of funding. The resulting 
increased  cost  of  financial  intermediation  would  then  reduce  the  level  of  consumption  and 
investment  in  the  economy,  thus  resulting  in  lower  output  on  an  ongoing  basis.  It  is  worth 
reminding that the focus of this paper on the steady-state costs leads to discharging potential 
volume effects derived from more stringent capital holdings. In other words, the steady-state 
analysis focuses only on price adjustments and does not consider any possible impact on credit 
rationing. In this section, we estimate the steady-state economic costs, again in terms of forgone 
output, of higher capital ratios.  
Several  approaches  can  be  employed  to  estimate  the  costs  associated  with  tightened  capital 
levels. Typically, time series models must be used to estimate the long-run impact of changes in 
capital ratios. These include VECM (see, among others, Gambacorta 2011) and DSGE models 
(see Christiano et al, 2010). Because of limited data availability and because of the cross-country 
nature of our study, we adopt a panel data model to estimate the long-run impact of changes in 
capital buffers. 
Our empirical strategy requires a two-step approach. First, we assume that banks pass on to their 
customers the cost associated with higher capital ratios and estimate the impact of tightened 
capital ratios on lending spreads, i.e. the lending rate premium over the deposit rate. Second, we 
assume that the cost of credit has an impact on economic activity through lower consumption 
and investment and estimate the impact of higher lending spread on output. 
To quantify the impact of higher capital levels on lending spreads, we estimate the following 
panel data model with fixed effects, to account for unobserved heterogeneity across economies: 
                                                  
where LS is the lending spread calculated as the difference between the lending and the deposit 
rate; CAR is the capital and reserves to total asset ratio; ROE is the return on equity; and, r is the 
real interest rate. The panel includes 22 cross-sections observed between 2001 and 2008.
 The   16 
estimation of the model is based on annual data.
9 The 22 countries included in the panel are: 
Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, 
Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo and Zambia. Table 3 shows the results. 
Table 3: The impact of capital ratios on lending spreads 
 
Capital-Asset Ratio 0.084*
Return On Equity 0.066**
Real Interest Rate 0.067*
R-Squared 0.758  
We find that the capital-asset ratio has a positive and significant impact on lending spreads. In 
particular, all else being equal, a 1 percent increase in the capital-asset ratio increases the lending 
spread by about 8.4 basis points. Notice also that the ROE and the real interest rate both enter 
significantly with the expected sign. When the ROE decreases, banks need to increase the spread 
they  charge  to  their  clients  to  keep  profitability  unchanged:  all  other  things  being  equal,  a 
decrease of 1 percent in the ROE increases the lending spread by 6.6 basis points. Finally, the 
real interest rate is found to be positively correlated with the lending spread. 
The second step requires estimation of the impact of lending spreads on real output. To this aim, 
we estimate a standard IS relationship augmented with the lending spread. The panel data model 
is: 
                                     
where Y is real GDP.
 10 Results are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4: The impact of lending spread on output 
 
Lending spread -0.93133***
Real interest rate -0.0377**
R-Squared 0.810  
We find that the lending spread enters significantly at all levels and with a negative sign. In 
particular, the estimated panel data model suggests that a 1 percent increase in the lending spread 
decreases output by about 93 basis points. As expected, the real interest rate is also significant at 
a 5 percent level and negatively correlated with output, as implied by the textbook downward 
sloping IS curve.  
                                                 
9 Data for lending spreads, CAR and real interest rates are taken from the IMF IFS database. Data on ROE are taken 
from Bankscope. We include in the model all countries for which we find data, except Zimbabwe which, because of 
hyperinflation, represents a clear outlier.  
10 Data for real GDP are taken from the World Development Indicators.   17 
The final step of our empirical analysis of the costs associated with more stringent capital ratios 
is to map the results obtained for the capital-asset ratio into the relevant regulatory variable. 
Given the 1.44:1 relationship between CAR and Tier1/RWA previously estimated, a 1 percent 
increase in the Tier1/RWA ratio implies an increase of about 6 basis points in the lending spread. 
In turn, this implies that a 1 percent increase in the Tier1/RWA ratio would have a cost in terms 
of GDP of about 0.056 percent. Importantly, as the models employed to estimate the long-run 
costs of higher capital ratios are linear, the effects of tightened capital holdings are linear as well. 
That is, a doubling of the increase in capital doubles the effect on output and so on. This implies 
that, differently from the estimation of the benefits, the starting level of capitalization does not 
matter. Table 5 summarizes the long-run impact of Tier 1/RWA on lending spreads  and on 
output. 
Table 5: Impact of increases in Tier 1/RWA on lending spread and GDP 
 






+12% 0.968% 0.901%  
4.  Costs and benefits compared 
This section brings together the findings of the previous sections to derive a summary calculation 
of the long-term economic impact of higher capital ratios. Table 6 provides summaries of the 
results from the previous sections of the paper. They show the estimated benefits and costs and 
corresponding net benefits measured by the percentage change in the yearly level of GDP for 
hypothetical increases in capital ratios. The results are relative to the pre-reform steady-state, 
proxied by the historical average of the Tier 1/RWA ratio and the frequency of banking crises.  
Table 6: Expected annual benefits and costs of tighter capital ratios (in terms of GDP level) 
Change in Tier1/RWA Expected benefits (%) Expected costs (%) Net benefits (%)
2% 0.287 0.113 0.174
4% 0.448 0.225 0.223
6% 0.532 0.338 0.194
8% 0.576 0.451 0.125
10% 0.595 0.676 -0.081
12% 0.602 0.901 -0.299  
The main conclusion is that the expected long-term net benefit for Africa is estimated to be 
positive for a broad range of the Tier 1/RWA ratio. Net benefits are found to be positive when 
the  Tier  1/RWA  is  increased  by  up  to  9  percent  from  current  levels.  There  are  increasing 
marginal net benefits up to a Tier 1/RWA of about 26 percent, or 5 percentage points higher than   18 
current levels, after which they start declining and eventually turn negative when the Tier 1 ratio 
reaches 30 percent.  
Starting  from  different  capital  levels  reflecting  different  initial  conditions,  these  results  are 
broadly in line with those found for advanced economies, although their magnitude is lower, 
reflecting milder gross benefits for Africa (see Chart 1). This is due to the fact that, starting from 
different  capital  levels,  marginal  reductions  in  the  probability  of  banking  crises  induced  by 
heightened capital ratios are found to be lower for African countries, probably reflecting in part 
the relatively stronger capitalization of the African banking systems (see Chart 2). Moreover, 
output losses associated with systemic banking crises in Africa are found to be milder than the 
average estimated for advanced economies, possibly due to the fact that in Africa no crisis with a 
permanent effect on output was observed. 
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Our results show also that the estimated gross economic costs are lower for Africa than for 
advanced economies (see Chart 3). For example, we find that a one percent tightening in the 
capital ratio is associated with a loss of 5.6 basis points in terms of GDP in the long-run, whereas 
the median cost estimated for advanced economies is 9 basis points (BCBS, 2010b). As the 
economic costs of tightened capital ratios are assumed to be transmitted to the economy through 
higher lending spreads, these results might reflect the fact that interest rates in Africa are in 
general relatively high and therefore their marginal impact on investment and consumption is 
likely to be smaller than in advanced economies.  
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Chart 3: Estimated gross costs (% of GDP) 
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Africa BCBS (no permanent effect)
 
It is important to stress that these conclusions are subject to a number of caveats. First, there is 
uncertainty surrounding the estimates of the benefits because the measure of capital used on the 
multivariate logit is not the same variable targeted by regulators. The impact of official measures 
has been implied by mapping the capital-asset ratio into the Tier1/RWA ratio, used as a proxy 
for the regulatory capital ratio. Second, data availability   for African countries is limited. A 
longer span of the data would have increased the confidence of estimating the long -run impact 
on GDP of higher lending spreads. Third, our estimates are clearly subject to the Lucas’ critique. 
More  robust  estimates  would  have  been  based  on  DSGE  models,  but  data  limitations  have 
prevented to pursue this alternative empirical strategy.  
Moreover, similar to BCBS (2010b), a number of other possible long-term economic benefits 
and costs arising from higher capital ratios have not been taken into account. These include, 
among others: i) the possible underestimation or overestimation of the costs in terms of forgone 
output associated with banking crises, including a failure to correctly detect causal directions; ii) 
the likely positive effect that higher capital ratios have on smoothing the cyclicality of credit 
supply, which in turn affects the amplitude of the business cycle; iii) the possible adjustment in 
banks’ business models and operations induced by heightened capital levels, which may soften 
the full pass-through hypothesis of higher cost of funding, thus reducing the long-run costs; and, 
iv) the spillover effects from implementation of the new standards in the rest of the world, which 
might affect African economies through both the trade and the financial channel. 
5.  Conclusions and policy implications 
Motivated  by  the  recent  debate  on  the  macroeconomic  implications  of  the  new  regulatory 
standards, the so-called Basel III reform, this paper assesses the long-term economic benefits and 
costs of higher capital ratios for African economies. In particular, this paper estimates the impact 
of tightened capital holdings on economic performance measured by changes in the steady-state 
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Adopting a methodology used in similar studies (Barrell et al, 2009; BCBS, 2010b; Bank of 
Canada, 2010; Wong et al, 2010), we first quantify the gross benefits in terms of gains in African 
GDP resulting from a reduced probability of future banking crises. Based on existing data on the 
historical  frequency  of  systemic  banking  crisis  and  associated  output  losses  in  Africa 
documented in Laeven and Valencia (2010), we map higher capital ratios into reductions in the 
probability of crisis using a multi-variate logit model for a panel of 19 countries over the period 
1980-2008. We then estimate the long-run economic costs of higher capital ratios on output 
employing two panel data for 22 countries over the period 2001-2008. The first model analyzes 
the  long-run  relationship  between  capital  holdings  and  lending  spreads.  The  second  model 
examines the long-term relationship between lending spreads and GDP. We finally combine the 
estimated costs and benefits to quantify the net effect of higher capital ratios on aggregate output 
of African economies.  
The results of the empirical analysis show positive net benefits from capital tightening, with 
output gains for increased regulatory capital ratios up to 9 percentage points relative to current 
levels.  Starting  from  different  levels  of  capitalization  of  the  banking  sector,  which  reflect 
different initial conditions, net benefits for Africa are found to be lower than those estimated for 
advanced economies, with both lower expected gross benefits and costs.  
The findings of this paper suggest that there are marginal net macroeconomic benefits from 
increasing capital adequacy ratios of African banking systems from current levels. However, 
there are even more substantial gains to be made from preventing African banking systems from 
reducing their capital levels below existing levels. African banks hold on average considerably 
more capital than required by regulators. Actual Tier 1 regulatory capital ratios are close to 21 
percent  on  average  while  minimum  Tier  1  capital  requirements  range  from  4  percent  to  8 
percent. This implies that African banks can reduce their capital levels by more than half on 
average and still meet the solvency test. A key question for African bank regulators is, therefore, 
how to ensure that banking systems maintain current levels of capitalization and possibly raise 
their capital ratios. One option would be to increase minimum capital requirements so as to 
institutionalize  current  capital  levels.  Previous  research  primarily  focusing  on  advanced 
economies shows that risk-based bank capital ratios respond to changes in capital requirements, 
suggesting that regulatory capital requirements are effective in altering bank behavior.
11 Thus, 
from this perspective Basel III offers an important opportunity for African  regulators to place a 
regulatory floor under actual capital ratios. However, the calibration of the capital framework 
and the efficacy of prudential requirements in shaping bank behavior in the African context 
require further research.  
Higher capital requirements, however, are not panacea for financial stability. Therefore, as 
African countries advance their financial sector reform agenda, they might want to emphasize 
                                                 
11 See Van Hoose (2008) for a review of the literature and Francis and Osborne (2009b) for more recent work on UK 
banks.   21 
other areas which are equally critical to prevent episodes of financial fragility. In this context, 
policy objectives might include, among others: i) improving timely disclosure of high quality 
information,  including  comprehensive  and  internationally  accepted  accounting  principles;  ii) 
promoting the adoption of a sound corporate governance framework in order to achieve and 
maintain public trust and confidence in the banking system; iii) increasing compliance with the 
Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision; iv) strengthening the relevant legal and 
institutional framework, introducing a crisis management system and resolution process, and a 
carefully designed deposit insurance system; v) improving the quality of banking supervision. 
A final caveat is in order. The findings of this paper are subject to substantial uncertainties. Data 
and model limitations and the difficulty of mapping capital ratios in reductions of the probability 
of banking crisis are factors which inevitably affect the results. Moreover, we omitted several 
elements from our analysis which may be important. Specifically, the assessment conducted in 
this paper would benefit from considering the impact of higher capital requirements on African 
GDP volatility. Another dimension which would enrich our assessment is the expected impact on 
African macroeconomic performance from tightened capital rules in the rest of the world. We 
leave these areas for future research.  
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